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Such is the nature of despair, this sickness of the self, this sickness 
unto death.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The “sickness unto death,” in Søren Kierkegaard’s work of 
the same name, is the despair an individual experiences in real-
                                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. Thanks to Helen Alvaré, 
Jud Campbell, Rick Garnett, Paul Horwitz, John Inazu, Randy Kozel, Mark 
Movsesian, Mark Rienzi, Steven Shiffrin, Anna Su, Nelson Tebbe, Adam White, 
George Wright, and the participants at the conference on “Religion and the Ad-
ministrative State” at the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administra-
tive State at George Mason University. 
 1. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH: A CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL EXPOSITION FOR UPBUILDING AND AWAKENING 21 (Howard V. Hong & Edna 
H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1980) (1849). 
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izing that the self is separated from God.2 In perceiving the di-
vision of the finite self from the infinite God, and in yearning 
for a union that is impossible, the individual despairs of his 
individuality—of his autonomous liberty and detachment from 
the divine—and strives mightily to reattach the self to some-
thing collective, extrinsic, and transcendent. Back to God.3 
Something like this despair now afflicts the First Amend-
ment in American law and culture. But it was not always so. In 
the early American Republic, free speech was conceived as a 
natural right that government ought often to constrain in order 
to achieve or protect certain collective social goods. Its purpos-
es, as well as its limits, were understood in instrumental, com-
munal, and other-regarding terms. Those purposes and limits 
assumed that the political community could and should make 
value judgments among different ideas. The justifications for 
and limits to free speech were closely aligned with those in-
voked for religious freedom. Both freedoms were conceived 
within a larger framework of collective, extrinsic ends. 
But beginning in the middle decades of the twentieth centu-
ry, courts and commentators increasingly justified freedom of 
speech as enhancing and maximizing individual autonomy. 
Other earlier justifications and limits steadily receded in prom-
inence. By the late twentieth century, these justifications and 
limits had largely been supplanted by the view that free speech 
was intrinsically valuable for human identity and self-
actualization. 
During this period, the self-regarding rationale for free 
speech was united with a related prudential consideration that 
repudiated any state or official orthodoxy as to the value of 
speech. The new rule was that the government must never 
make judgments about the substantive worth of speech, and 
that courts must assiduously guard against communal efforts 
to set “content-based” limits on the full freedom of speech.4 In 
                                                                                                                                         
 2. The phrase is taken by Kierkegaard from John 11:4 (King James), where Jesus, 
having been apprised by Mary and Martha of the illness of Lazarus, says to them: 
“This sickness is not unto death . . . .” 
 3. See DAPHNE HAMPSON, KIERKEGAARD: EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE 221–22 
(2013) (describing Kierkegaard’s view of the “relational self” as one which “un-
derstands the person to be grounded extrinsically . . . . Kierkegaard understands 
the relation to God to be foundational to the self coming to itself.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 530, 537 (1980). 
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the rhetoric of American law and culture, free speech was, in 
this period, routinely defended as inherently good for the indi-
vidual, or even as constitutive of what it means to be Ameri-
can. Some limits remained, but communal political judgments 
about the value of the content of speech were no longer 
thought legitimate grounds for legal restriction. “Anti-
orthodoxy” of all kinds became a watchword of free speech 
protection. For both principled and prudential reasons, gov-
ernment could never be granted the power to judge the value 
of speech. 
Yet once the right of free speech was understood as a self-
regarding and intrinsic end of human fulfillment, very little 
remained to inform its exercise beyond the caprice of the exer-
ciser. As before, the prevailing legal conception of the right of 
free speech was united with that of the right of freedom of reli-
gion during this period: solipsistic, personalized, changeable, 
deracinated from any common purposes and traditions, and 
often unchallengeable inasmuch as there were no acceptable, 
extrinsic criteria for doing so—and certainly none with which 
the political community could be trusted. Within this frame-
work, the scope of free speech as well as religious liberty rights 
greatly expanded. The last hundred years represent, as one re-
cent book reports, “The Free Speech Century,”5 and the right of 
religious freedom also enjoyed enormous growth. 
In recent years, however, this expansion has met with re-
sistance and arguments for constriction by both academics and 
judges. The new free speech constrictors have criticized free 
speech rights principally by setting them against other rights 
and interests, such as democracy, dignity, equality, sexual au-
tonomy, antidiscrimination, decency, and progressivism.6 For 
the new free speech constrictors, it is these other rights and in-
terests, not free speech, that are the true or defining American 
civic goods. There have been parallel developments in debates 
about the scope of religious freedom. In both contexts, for ex-
ample, the constrictors use the metaphor of “weaponization,” 
and sometimes even speak of violence, in objecting to rights of 
religious and speech freedom that they believe undermine 
more important political and social goods. In both contexts, 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 1–2 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 
2019). 
 6. For only a partial catalog and discussion, see infra Part III. 
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some variation of “third-party harm” frequently serves as a 
counterweight to, and limitation on, First Amendment rights. 
In arguing for new First Amendment limits, the constrictors 
hearken to an earlier period in attempting to reconceive free-
dom of speech in instrumental terms—as serving, and being 
delimited by, specific common ends. Once the right of free 
speech was hollowed out of any common civic ends, it was 
rendered problematic, if not intolerable, to those who believed 
that free speech should serve other, greater social and civic in-
terests. The rise of the constrictors was a predictable result, and 
the right of free speech, evacuated of its prior ends and limits, 
could now be infused with new ones, including some derived 
from other areas of constitutional law.7 
The sickness unto death of the First Amendment is that the 
spectacular success of free speech and religious freedom as 
American constitutional rights, premised on liberal, individual 
autonomy, has been the very cause of mounting and powerful 
collective anxiety. The impressive growth in the twentieth cen-
tury of these rights has rendered them fragile, if not unsustain-
able, in their current form. Their unprecedented expansion has 
brought on an awareness of their emptiness in serving the larg-
er, common political good. The yearning for political communi-
ty and a shared purpose transcending individual interest has in 
turn generated vigorous calls for First Amendment constriction 
in service of what are claimed to be higher ends—in some cases 
ends that were promoted by the hypertrophy of the First 
Amendment itself. 
What binds these claims is the view that expansive First 
Amendment rights harm others or, more generally, are socially 
or politically harmful. In some cases, the same people who ar-
gued that free speech rights should be disconnected from 
common civic ends now advocate free speech constriction in 
order to reconnect free speech to new ends said to be constitu-
tive of the American polity. The same is true for religious free-
                                                                                                                                         
 7. The eminent free-speech historian David Rabban wrote nearly twenty years 
ago that “[i]rony abounds in this development,” because the “political left typical-
ly advocated greater protection for speech” in the pre-war period. DAVID M. RAB-
BAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 381 (1997). This article, though grate-
fully drawing on Rabban’s work in Part II, offers a somewhat different diagnosis 
of this development in Part III. 
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dom. But in a society that is deeply divided about where the 
common good lies, imposing new limits on First Amendment 
rights in the name of dignity, democracy, equality, sexual free-
dom, third-party harm, or any of the other purposes champi-
oned by the new constrictors is at least as likely to exacerbate 
social and civic fragmentation as to reconstitute a new social 
cohesion. 
Part I of this paper describes early American understandings 
of the purposes and limits of freedom of speech. During this 
period, the outer bounds of freedom of speech reflected similar 
limits on the right of religious freedom: both were conceived 
within an overarching framework of natural rights delimited 
by legislative judgments about the common political good. 
Though there is scholarly debate about how much the Four-
teenth Amendment may have altered that approach in certain 
details, the basic legal framework remained intact in the nine-
teenth century. 
Part II traces the replacement of that framework with a very 
different one in the twentieth century, describing the judicial 
turn toward self-regarding justifications of speech that priori-
tize individual autonomy, self-actualization, and absolute anti-
orthodoxy. Contrary to Professor G. Edward White’s descrip-
tion of this development as free speech’s “com[ing] of age,”8 
this article argues that the period is better characterized as the 
“adolescence” of free speech—one marked especially by the 
ascendancy of internally oriented and self-regarding justifica-
tions for both speech and religious freedom. 
The article describes the crisis or despair of free speech and 
the coming of the First Amendment constrictors in Part III. It 
concludes briefly in Part IV by recapitulating the parallel paths 
of the rights of free speech and religious freedom, disagreeing 
with the work of some scholars who argue that, for cultural 
reasons, free speech in its present expansive form is more se-
cure today than religious freedom. It is, in fact, remarkable that 
over the centuries, some of the most prominent justifications 
for and objections to the scope of these rights have proceeded 
pari passu and assumed nearly identical shape. 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free 
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996). 
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I. PERIOD ONE: FIRST AMENDMENT NATURAL RIGHTS AND 
LIMITS 
All governments negotiate the balance between permitting 
and restricting speech within an overarching conceptual 
framework of the ends and limits of free speech. That frame-
work may be thick or thin, explicitly articulated or unspoken, 
clearly understood or only hazily, if at all, perceived. But all 
governments grapple with the central problem of free speech—
how best to regulate speech so as to avert excessive social hurt, 
while allowing as much expression as may be tolerated—
within a larger set of ideas about the social virtues and vices of 
speech.9 
American conceptual frameworks for free speech have not 
remained static across time. The early American understanding 
of free speech, for example, was not grounded in an abstract 
justification or theory of speech’s value as a unique good. The 
right and the good of free speech in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century America were located within a larger world view that 
distinguished natural rights—rights that one could exercise in 
the state of nature or without government action—from other 
rights that depended upon government intervention.10 The 
right of free speech was “natural” in the sense that, unlike oth-
er rights such as habeas corpus or the right to a trial by a jury 
of one’s peers, it was an element of “natural liberty”11—“the 
freedom an individual could enjoy as a human in the absence 
of government.”12 
Even in the state of nature, the scope of one’s natural rights 
did not encompass uses that interfered with the natural rights 
of others.13 As James Madison put it in The Federalist No. 43, 
“the moral relations” and obligations imposed by natural 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. For further discussion of this problem, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Free-
dom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465, 1487–88 (2016). 
 10. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 
252–53 (2017). 
 11. Id. at 253. 
 12. Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitu-
tions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 919 (1993). 
 13. For the founding generation, the state of nature was not an amoral or asocial 
condition. Rather, it was simply the social condition in which people lived before 
the organized state. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE IN-
TELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 62 (1985) (describing the state of na-
ture as “the absence of organized political society and of government”). 
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rights “will remain uncancelled” for any state that refused to 
ratify the Constitution.14 Yet once natural rights like freedom of 
speech were incorporated into the social contract, several addi-
tional limitations on them were warranted. The people’s repre-
sentatives, not the judiciary, were empowered to impose these 
limits in the service of a general concept of common social wel-
fare and protection, variously denominated the “public inter-
est,” the “common good,” the “collective interest,” or the “gen-
eral welfare.”15 Though there were often prudential 
disagreements among lawmakers about what this collective, 
social ideal demanded concerning particular, political applica-
tions,16 there was no challenge to the general principle that the 
common good properly circumscribed the right of free speech, 
including on matters of substance or content. 
The right of free speech coexisted with and promoted the 
moral duties of the rights holder to the community.17 Speech 
regulations that promoted public morality were considered 
“necessary for ensuring sufficient public order to host, defend, 
and extend individual liberty.”18 So, for example, “[b]lasphemy 
and profane swearing . . . were thought to be harmful to society 
and were thus subject to governmental regulation even though 
they did not directly interfere with the rights of others.”19 Blas-
phemy was punished in part to promote public respect for reli-
gion, and most especially Christianity—“the foundation of 
moral obligation”20—and in part for its tendency to disturb 
public order.21 The punishment of blasphemy was not thought 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 230 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 15. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 273 (collecting and quoting sources). 
 16. Most prominent among which was the advisability of proscribing seditious 
speech. See id. at 277–79. 
 17. See THOMAS G. WEST, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: 
NATURAL RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE MORAL CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 6 
(2017) (“Government encourages the people to respect and fight for the natural 
rights of fellow citizens by promoting appropriate moral conduct, including devo-
tion to the common good.”). 
 18. See MARK E. KANN, TAMING PASSION FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: POLICING SEX IN 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC 21 (2013). 
 19. Campbell, supra note 10, at 276–77. 
 20. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
 21. See JAMES S. KABALA, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1787–1846, at 124–28 (2013) (discussing early American blasphemy 
law); see also Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 399 (Pa. 1824). 
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to be inconsistent with rights of religious free exercise: there 
was believed to be a difference between what James Kent de-
scribed as “decent discussions” of religious differences and 
“revil[ing] with malicious and blasphemous contempt.”22 Pro-
scribed speech also included certain types of advertising of 
immoral activities (such as gambling), the making of certain 
kinds of agreements on Sundays,23 and other forms of speech 
thought threatening to the general morality, peace, and good 
order.24 Pennsylvania’s 1779 “Act for the Suppression of Vice 
and Immorality,” for example, prohibited “profane swearing, 
cursing, drunkeness [sic], cock fighting, bullet playing, horse 
racing, shooting matches and the playing or gaming for money 
or other valuable things, fighting of duels and such evil prac-
tices which tend greatly to debauch the minds and corrupt the 
morals of the subjects of this commonwealth.”25 
Likewise, libelous speech was well within the regulatory 
power, and what today goes by the name of “expressive con-
duct”26 did not enjoy presumptive protection, let alone immun-
ity from government control. To the contrary, the government 
enjoyed broad discretion to regulate this manifestation of the 
natural right of free speech in furtherance of the public good.27 
Laws punishing obscene or sexually suggestive speech were 
also uncontroversial, inasmuch as the protection of the natural 
right of marriage was deemed an important office of the state.28 
As William Paley put it in his widely read The Principles of Mor-
                                                                                                                                         
 22. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 294. 
 23. Sunday closing laws are not examples of speech restrictions, but they are 
part of the larger phenomenon of state regulation of activities on Sunday. Their 
history is recounted in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431–35 (1961). 
 24. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 310 n.285. 
 25. Act of March 14, 1779, 9 Statutes at Large of Pa. 333. 
 26. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–05 (1989). 
 27. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 286–87 (“Some expressive conduct, like in-
stinctive smiles, surely fell on the side of inalienability. But when expressive con-
duct caused harm and governmental power to restrict that conduct served the 
public good, there is no reason to think that the freedom of opinion nonetheless 
immunized that conduct.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 102–04 (Pa. 1815). 
Geoffrey Stone has emphasized the rarity of such prosecutions. See Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857, 1863 (2007). 
Yet they did exist, and nobody suggested that sanctioning obscenity, post-
publication, was an inappropriate role for the state. See Genevieve Lakier, The 
Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2187 (2015) (distinguishing 
between prior restraints on obscenity and criminal prosecutions after publication). 
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al and Political Philosophy, “[i]f fornication be criminal, all those 
incentives which lead to it are accessaries [sic] to the crime, 
as . . . wanton songs, pictures, [and] books.”29 Laws against ob-
scenity were not often enforced, but had particular salience in 
cases where their violation was “open and notorious.”30 
So conceived and delimited, the right of free speech assumed 
a dualistic structure. At its core was an inalienable natural right 
to express, as Jud Campbell puts it, “well-intentioned state-
ments of one’s thoughts”—statements of thoughts made hon-
estly, decently, and in good faith.31 Parties to the social compact 
would have no reason to protect the right to make dishonest or 
bad faith statements of one’s dishonest or bad faith thoughts. 
This narrow right of free speech was nevertheless deep. What it 
covered was categorically outside the cognizance or jurisdic-
tion of the state and therefore categorically exempt from regu-
lation. The right of stating one’s opinions in good faith was de-
rivative of the non-volitional natural fact of having such opin-
opinions and of the classical liberal view that it was futile to 
coerce a person either not to have opinions or to change them 
to conform to someone else’s.32 If there was anything categori-
cally anti-censorial about freedom of speech, it lay only in this 
narrow core.33 
But beyond this core lay a vast periphery of other contexts in 
which the natural right of speech was alienable depending up-
on political judgments about the requirements of the common 
good. While the existing deposit of common law traditions as-
sisted the lawmaker in determining the contours of the de-
mands of the public good, decisions about the scope of free 
speech outside the core were left primarily to legislative judg-
                                                                                                                                         
 29. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 173 
(Liberty Fund 2002) (1785). 
 30. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTO-
RY 130–31 (1993). 
 31. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 280–83. 
 32. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, [ca. 8 June] 1785, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 295–306 (Robert A. 
Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973) (“[T]he opinions of men, depending 
only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates 
of other men . . . .”). 
 33. But see FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–13 (2017). 
Abrams makes the case for restraint of government censorship as the overriding 
end of free speech, but he does not adequately distinguish between the modes in 
which the freedom might be exercised. 
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ment and discretion.34 There was, as Genevieve Lakier has ar-
gued, no overarching theory of the sorts of speech that were 
valuable or worthless, but that did not mean that the content of 
speech could not be regulated: “expression could be criminally 
sanctioned whenever it posed even a relatively attenuated 
threat to public peace and order.”35 
It is this two-tiered framework that formed the basis for a set 
of shared assumptions about speech36 which, as Campbell ar-
gues, informed the meaning of the Constitution’s Speech 
Clause.37 To “abridge” freedom of speech was either to regulate 
the unalienable component of the freedom (that is, the freedom 
to make good faith statements of one’s thoughts, setting aside 
its own natural limits) or to restrict speech of the alienable com-
ponent beyond what was required by the need to protect the 
public good.38 What Congress could not do in “making no law” 
that abridged the right of free speech was to exceed the proper 
limits of a regulatory threshold. But Congress was not thereby 
removed from evaluating and regulating the content of 
speech—particularly for purposes of preserving general wel-
fare, common morality, and the public good—tout court. 
One virtue of this explanatory framework is its analogue in 
the right to religious freedom. Indeed, in almost every respect, 
the structure of the protection for and limits on the right of free 
speech mirrors that of religious freedom. Like the right of free 
speech, religious freedom was also considered a natural right.39 
James Madison, for example, explicitly united the two, refer-
ring in his notes on the Bill of Rights to “natural rights, re-
                                                                                                                                         
 34. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 291. 
 35. Lakier, supra note 28, at 2181. Lakier’s core claim concerns the broad con-
demnation of prior restraints in the early Republic and thereafter, irrespective of 
content. See id. at 2179–80. 
 36. See Hamburger, supra note 12, at 917 (“Congregationalists and Baptists, Fed-
eralists and Anti-Federalists, Southerners and Northerners, all could use the natu-
ral rights analysis and, even while developing different versions of that analysis, 
they appear to have drawn upon certain shared assumptions.”(citations omitted)). 
 37. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 251. 
 38. See id. at 305. 
 39. See, e.g., DEL. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2 (“[A]ll men have a natural and un-
alienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences and understanding . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 2; N.C. CONST. of 
1776, § 19. 
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tained—as Speech [and] Con[science].”40 John Locke wrote that 
“Liberty of Conscience is every mans natural Right, equally 
belonging to Dissenters as to [established institutions].”41 Reli-
gious freedom’s inalienability depended, just as for speech, on 
the view that it was futile for the government to compel people 
to embrace religious beliefs with which they disagreed.42 
Yet the nature of the claim about religious liberty was not 
merely pragmatic but theological: for “true and saving Religion 
consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; without which 
nothing can be acceptable to God.”43 Indeed, the connection 
between the natural rights justifications for free speech and re-
ligious liberty is precisely a view about the operation of the 
natural laws of God, and about man’s created nature and obli-
gations to God.44 For even if legal compulsion could change a 
person’s mind (an empirical proposition about which the evi-
dence must surely be more mixed than these Enlightenment 
voices admit), “yet would not that help at all to the Salvation of 
their Souls. For, there being but one Truth”—the Christian 
truth, so it was thought—there is only “one way to heaven,” 
which can only be reached by obedience to the dictates of 
“Conscience[].”45 
Just as for speech, the ends and limits of the natural right of 
religious freedom imparted to it a dual structure, with a core 
untouchable by positive law, and a periphery that could be po-
liced and regulated by the legislature in furtherance of the 
common good. At the core, as Vincent Phillip Muñoz has ar-
gued, is a form of religious exercise that is wholly exempt from 
the jurisdiction of the State—a right retained from the state of 
nature that is not subject to the authority of government.46 Yet 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress, [ca. 8 June] 1789, in 12 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, at 194 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 
1979). 
 41. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 53 (Mark Goldie ed., Lib-
erty Fund 2010) (1689) (footnote omitted). 
 42. See id. at 13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Madison’s argument in Memorial and Remonstrance concerning compelled 
opinions is conjoined to another concerning “the duty of every man to render to 
the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.” 
Madison, supra note 32, at 295–306. 
 45. LOCKE, supra note 41, at 14. 
 46. Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights 
and Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110 AM. POL. SCI. 
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the scope of this unalienable right was, at least by modern 
lights, narrow. It certainly encompassed the right to worship,47 
but it did not extend to what Muñoz calls “religious inter-
ests.”48 And yet Muñoz and Campbell both emphasize that this 
approach had the salutary effect of preserving the core of these 
rights, whether of free speech or religious liberty, in unadulter-
ated form: there could be no judicial balancing-away of the 
core for other putatively greater ends.49 
Religious interests outside the core, however, spanned the 
broad periphery of potential claims to religious exemption 
from general laws on account of religious scruple. And as to 
these peripheral manifestations of religious freedom, the legis-
lature enjoyed broad delimiting discretion in accordance with 
its view of the public good, peace, and order.50 So, for example, 
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights protected the right of subjects 
to “worship[] God in the manner . . . most agreeable to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, . . . provided he doth not disturb 
the public peace.”51 There is a longstanding debate between 
those who claim that religious exemptions were constitutional-
ly required under some circumstances and those who argue 
that they were always a matter of legislative grace.52 But even 
advocates of the former view would probably agree that reli-
gious interests—particular forms of exercise outside the core 
protection for worship—were highly regulated in the early 
American Republic, and that constitutional appeal to the courts 
in such cases was unavailing. 
                                                                                                                                         
REV. 369, 373 (2016) (“This lack of sovereignty means that legislators lack authori-
ty to prohibit that which belongs to the natural right of religious liberty.”). 
 47. Even here, however, there were natural limits on the right of religious wor-
ship. The possibility of, for example, child sacrifice as part of the natural right to 
religious worship would have been ruled out. 
 48. Muñoz, supra note 46, at 374. 
 49. See id. at 376–77 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993), as an example of modern judicial balancing as to the core of reli-
gious liberty); Campbell, supra note 10, at 316 (arguing that the contemporary 
judicial balancing approach “waters down what was originally absolute protec-
tion for well-intentioned statements of one’s views”). 
 50. See Muñoz, supra note 46, at 374. 
 51. MASS. CONST.  art. II; see also MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 33. 
 52. Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990), and Michael W. McConnell, 
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990), with 
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992). 
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For purposes of this Article, however, the critical point is that 
the dual hierarchy of the rights of free speech and religion 
rooted these rights in dual authorities external to the individu-
al. First, in God: for the unalienable elements of free speech and 
free religious exercise were both rights derived from and sol-
emn duties toward an authority transcending the self. Second, 
in the political community, and most particularly in its legisla-
ture: when the individual left the state of nature, a part of the 
social contract he entered into assigned the government the re-
sponsibility to constrain his natural liberties of speech and reli-
gious exercise to further the social goods of safety, morality, 
and public order. “The founders,” wrote Thomas West, “did 
not separate rights from duties. They believed that the laws of 
nature and of nature’s God impose moral obligations on hu-
man beings in their dealings with other people.”53 Virtuous be-
havior was a condition of the freedoms of speech and religion. 
The genesis, nature, and limits of these natural rights all de-
pended upon their connection to sources of authority and obli-
gation outside of and transcending the self. 
II. PERIOD TWO: THE TURN INWARD 
The early view of free speech’s value and limits—which of-
ten depended upon judgments about the social worth of free 
speech—endured into the twentieth century, even if the natural 
rights framework that grounded it steadily declined in influ-
ence.54 Some scholars have argued that there were significant 
conceptual changes following ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, where there was a renewed focus on freedom of 
speech,55 and prosecutions for blasphemy, for example, became 
problematic under the Establishment Clause through operation 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. WEST, supra note 17, at 47. There is rich disagreement about whether the 
early combination of liberal and republican views—of rights and duties—was 
integrated and internally consistent, or instead a kind of patchwork whose com-
mitments existed in tension with one another. See id. at 44–47. This Article takes 
no position on that debate, instead simply describing the coexistence of these 
views. 
 54. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 259. 
 55. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVI-
LEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 362–63 
(2000). 
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of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.56 Yet whatever changes 
were intended by the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
during the period from the Civil War to World War I, the Court 
consistently upheld regulations of speech that were perceived 
to have a “bad tendency”—a tendency to produce an action 
that was threatening to social order and morality.57 Even de-
fenders of a more expansive scope for free speech rights after 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification acknowledge that the 
bad tendency test was invoked successfully “against antiwar 
speech during the Civil War and World War I,”58 and in be-
tween as well. In Ex Parte Jackson, for example, the Court unan-
imously upheld a provision of the Comstock Act of 1873 pro-
hibiting the mailing of lottery advertisements against First 
Amendment challenge, concluding that a law proscribing “ob-
scene” and “indecent” activities that “are supposed to have a 
demoralizing influence upon the people” was perfectly in 
keeping with freedom of speech.59 
Even as there were contrary strains of libertarian-inflected 
thought concerning speech in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries,60 and occasionally the odd judicial swipe at what 
was felt by some to be an outdated and fussy legal moralism,61 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The 
Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995). The thesis of a 
“second adoption” and a changed meaning of the Establishment Clause, however, 
has been disputed. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
287–334 (2002). 
 57. RABBAN, supra note 7, at 132; see also United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 
194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904) (applying the bad tendency test to the views of an anar-
chist in upholding his conviction and deportation under a federal statute). Rabban 
notes that this test can be (and was) traced to Blackstone’s view that “criminal 
libels” consisted of “writings ‘of an immoral or illegal tendency,’” together with 
other speech that provokes breaches of the peace. RABBAN, supra note 7, at 134 
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150). But regard for the public 
good was often implicit in the social contractarian view of the limits of natural 
rights, a view that Blackstone endorsed. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *118–41 (chronicling the “Rights of Persons”). 
 58. CURTIS, supra note 55, at 385. 
 59. 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877). 
 60. See RABBAN, supra note 7, at 23, ch. 1 (describing a “tradition of libertarian 
radicalism” in the late nineteenth century that “defended the primary value of 
individual autonomy against the power of church and state”). It is notable, how-
ever, that this stream of libertarian thought did not have much effect on the 
courts. 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.) 
(criticizing the prevailing test of obscenity—”[w]hether the tendency of the matter 
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as late as 1907, the Supreme Court would say that the govern-
ment could punish speech that “may be deemed contrary to the 
public welfare.”62 And free speech skepticism did not come on-
ly from what would today be considered social conservatives. 
David Rabban has observed that before World War I, progres-
sives were not sympathetic to speech rights that they perceived 
as inconsistent with positive social reforms or that blocked 
egalitarian and redistributive measures.63 As for American 
judges of the pre-war period, “no group of Americans was 
more hostile to free speech claims before World War I than the 
judiciary, and no judges were more hostile than the justices on 
the United States Supreme Court.”64 All of this was generally in 
keeping with the early republican view, which tied freedom of 
speech closely to legislative judgments about limits on speech 
to serve the public good, though it was perhaps an even more 
restrictive approach. 
A. The First Wave of Change: Political Speech’s Preferred Position 
When conceptual change did come to the law in the twenti-
eth century, change whose causes were manifold,65 it came in 
two waves. In the first wave, the Supreme Court (following, in 
part, the scholarly claims of Zechariah Chafee66), emphasized 
that political speech, and especially dissenting political views, 
merited special solicitude under the First Amendment because 
of its contribution toward the development and strengthening 
of democratic government. Though it had not previously been 
conceptualized in precisely these terms, this democracy-
enhancing justification for the right of free speech might be seen 
as consistent with the early American view that there was a 
core or natural right to the good faith expression of one’s 
                                                                                                                                         
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to 
such immoral influences”—as a discreditable example of “mid-Victorian morals” 
(citation omitted)). 
 62. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
 63. See RABBAN, supra note 7, at 3. 
 64. Id. at 15. 
 65. It is not my purpose to survey the reasons for these changes. Surely the “war 
to end all wars”—and yet which did no such thing—was one cause, and there 
were many others. This Article, however, focuses on the nature of the changes to 
the conceptual framework of free speech as manifested in legal, and primarily 
Supreme Court, doctrine. 
 66. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). 
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thoughts. But the notion that politically dissenting speech mer-
ited a near-absolute, or “preferred position,”67 protection was 
already a considerable expansion. It meant that the political 
community was disabled as a legal matter from making any 
distinctions of value in the political speech of its members. 
So, for example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (joined by 
Justice Louis Brandeis) could say in his Gitlow dissent that the 
speech of a member of the Socialist Party of America could not 
be punished because it presented no “clear and present dan-
ger” to American government;68 it was merely “redundant dis-
course” with “no chance of starting a present conflagration.”69 
The “test of truth,” or truth-seeking, justification described by 
Holmes in his Abrams dissent, it should be remembered, re-
flected a pragmatic social interest in the soundest civic policy-
making that could survive in the marketplace competition for 
the fittest ideas.70 Truth-seeking and democratic governance, 
which are often separated as distinctive ends, thus share cer-
tain fundamental premises about the purposes of free speech.71 
In a similar way, Brandeis wrote in his Whitney concurrence 
that the speech of a communist could not be criminalized be-
cause “[t]hose who won our independence believed 
that . . . public discussion is a political duty; and that this 
should be a fundamental principle of the American govern-
                                                                                                                                         
 67. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). With 
the addition of Justice Wiley Rutledge to the Court in early 1943, the rhetoric of 
“preferred position” for political speech appeared in several of the Court’s majori-
ty decisions thereafter. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). 
For criticism of the “preferred position” transformation, see generally WALTER 
BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957). 
 68. On the changing meaning of the “clear and present danger” test from some-
thing approximating the “bad tendency” test to something more like incitement to 
violence, see RABBAN, supra note 7, at 132–46, and White, supra note 8, at 317–18, 
322–24. 
 69. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, Holmes’s dismissive attitude toward Gitlow’s ineffectual speech—his 
confidence that American democratic government could tolerate it exactly be-
cause it was so unimportant—has been criticized. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WOR-
THY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 155–56 (1988). On the differ-
ences between Holmes the skeptic and Brandeis the moral crusader, see PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 69–71 (1982). 
 70. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 71. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2464 (2018) (separating the “democratic form of government” and the 
“search for truth” arguments for free speech). 
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ment.”72 Brandeis’s “remedy” for the hurtful potential of false 
ideas is “more speech” because he was confident that the 
“more speech” would be undertaken under the protection of 
those secure and sturdy pillars of American government—
public education and democratic politics—that surely would 
overwhelm the ineffectual and false views of a weak and mis-
guided dissenter.73 But he believed that democratic citizenship 
would be strengthened and enriched by the confrontation with 
dissenting speech, as the power of rational thought in demo-
cratic decision making would thereby be honed.74 
The emphasis on the relationship of free speech and demo-
cratic government is perhaps nowhere more powerfully evi-
dent than in the work of the great mid-century speech scholar, 
Alexander Meiklejohn.75 Meiklejohn emphasized that the 
“model” of First Amendment free speech was the town meet-
ing, in which “the people of a community assemble to discuss 
and to act upon matters of public interest” and accept proce-
dural and substantive abridgements on their speech to fulfill 
the core democratic purposes of free speech.76 The town meet-
ing, he continued, “is not a Hyde Park. It is a parliament or 
congress . . . . It is not a dialectical free-for-all. It is self-
government.”77 His was a communitarian conception of free-
dom of speech—an expanded conception of the right both from 
the early republican position and from the more immediately 
anterior, highly restrictive view of the pre-war period that 
claimed “absolute” protection within the sphere of political 
speech but not elsewhere.78 
Yet the Meiklejohnian view was still delimited by some 
common political ends. The purpose of free speech was the 
formation of a better and more “rational” type of democratic 
self-government, which helps to explain Meiklejohn’s state-
ment that free speech’s “point of ultimate interest is not the 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 377. 
 74. See id. at 377–78; see also RABBAN, supra note 7, at 355–71 (emphasizing the 
democracy-enhancing features of Brandeis’s free speech jurisprudence). 
 75. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 76. Id. at 22. 
 77. Id. at 23. 
 78. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 245–66. 
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words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”79 The par-
adox in the democracy-enhancing justification for free speech 
has been noted before: it seems contradictory to promote dem-
ocratic governance by categorically protecting political speech 
that the people have elected to proscribe by democratically en-
acted laws.80 The “minds of the hearers” have already been 
made up in democratically authorized law. One evasion of the 
paradox is to concede that “democratic governance” means 
something other than raw popular or majoritarian preference—
perhaps something that depends upon a sufficient airing of 
dissenting opinion in order to ensure the proper, or rational, 
functioning of democracy.81 Yet the question remains precisely 
what sort of substantive values are promoted by this justifica-
tion for free speech, how much airing is enough, and who is to 
determine what constitutes proper or true or rational democra-
cy.82 
Yet these difficulties in some ways illustrate the collective 
character of the Meiklejohnian view. True or proper democra-
cy—the people’s arrival at “wise” decisions—consists in pro-
tection against the “mutilation of the thinking process of the com-
munity.”83 But speech that does tend to mutilate the collective 
enterprise is outside constitutional protection. Philip Ham-
burger has observed that theologically liberal assumptions and 
purposes were often at work in defining what counted as ra-
tional political decisions, as compared with those thought to 
depend upon irrational or blind adherence to received doctrine 
or authority.84 Thus, “propaganda”—often a “code word” for 
the speech of religious organizations and institutions—was not 
                                                                                                                                         
 79. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POW-
ERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960). 
 80. For canonical statements of this paradox, see LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A 
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 137 (2005); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 40–44 (1982); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREE-
MENT ch. 10 (1999). 
 81. See generally OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). 
 82. I confess to sharing Larry Alexander’s opinion that “I never find my views 
to be ‘adequately aired’ until everyone agrees with them.” ALEXANDER, supra note 
80, at 138 n.16. 
 83. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 75, at 26. 
 84. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LIBERAL SUPPRESSION: SECTION 501(C)(3) 
AND THE TAXATION OF SPEECH chs. 1 & 4 (2018). 
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regarded as worthy of the same protection in the law as other 
putatively healthier varieties of political speech.85 And yet such 
assumptions may have allowed Meiklejohn to invoke, as early 
Americans had also done in a different context, the “general 
welfare” as an organizing political aim and limit on free speech 
protection.86 Indeed, the democratic assembly is itself a selec-
tive group of people that are loyal to one another: “the people” 
excludes the criminal, the foreigner, the traitor to the communi-
ty, and even the person who does not have the community’s 
true interests at heart.87 The first wave of free speech reconcep-
tualization in this second historical period still retained an im-
portant element of mutual moral duty that shaped and delim-
ited the right to speak freely.88 
B. The Second Wave of Change: The Inward, Anti-Orthodoxy First 
Amendment 
The second wave of conceptual change was quite different. 
The first wave expanded the scope of speech rights to include a 
general protection against regulation of political dissent. But 
the right of free speech was still conceived collectively—as 
serving and being delimited by the common social and political 
good of achieving a more rational polity, however rationality 
might be measured. The second wave loosened and eventually 
removed those collective ends and limits by justifying free 
speech inwardly, coupled with a more thoroughgoing skepti-
cism about the state’s authority to make rules about speech for 
the common good. 
Freedom of speech now was understood to require special 
protection because verbal expression was believed to go to the 
essence of what it means to be human, protecting not only the 
                                                                                                                                         
 85. Id. at 95. 
 86. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 75, at 39 (“The constitutional status of a merchant 
advertising his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the advantage of his client, is 
utterly different from that of a citizen who is planning for the general welfare.”). 
 87. This view of the relevant political community is consistent with the earlier 
social contractarian position that “there is no natural right to become a citizen of a 
society that refuses to accept you.” WEST, supra note 17, at 118. 
 88. See Gerhart Niemeyer, A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Free Speech, 25 
THOUGHT: FORDHAM U. Q. 251, 259 (1950) (“[T]he question which concerns us is 
whether the doctrine of free speech admits of any criterion by which utterances 
may be recognized as either belonging to the circle of mutual loyalty or denying 
the basic community.”). 
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development of individual thought but also the self-realization 
or self-actualization of the speaker. Thus, free speech was re-
conceived as intrinsically valuable because it is a prerequisite 
for complete autonomy: “An autonomous person cannot accept 
without independent consideration the judgment of others as 
to what he should believe or what he should do.”89 This auton-
omy and identity-based justification was influenced by an egal-
itarian undercurrent: the notion that we treat people unequally 
unless we recognize and respect the beliefs that go to the core 
of their persons—their real or authentic selves. It is reflected in 
what one casebook refers to with the umbrella term, “individu-
al-centered theories” of the First Amendment,90 as well as Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas’s view that “the First Amend-
ment . . . enact[s] a distinctly individualistic notion of ‘the 
freedom of speech,’ and Congress may not simply collectivize 
that aspect of our society.”91 
As the second wave of conceptual change crested, it rapidly 
absorbed the first wave. American political or civic cohesion 
was no longer manifested in any shared set of substantive con-
victions of the people as a community, democratic or other-
wise, so much as in an allegiance to individual freedom itself. It 
was the view that very little that is permanent binds the People 
other than the conviction that very little that is permanent 
binds it. The forms of free speech were thought to be synony-
mous with its social value, and the “dialectical free for all” de-
plored by Meiklejohn was the result. Indeed, as to substantive 
evaluations of the content of speech, the second wave dissolved 
the idea of the People as anything other than a physical aggre-
gation of individual persons. 
The Supreme Court’s embrace of this second wave was 
gradual but steady. A critical step in its development was the 
union of inwardly oriented justifications for free speech with 
closely connected pragmatic worries that the government could 
not be trusted to make any judgments at all about the commu-
nal value of speech. Consider the widely celebrated case of 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, in which the 
                                                                                                                                         
 89. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS., 204, 
216 (1972). 
 90. VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 832–967 (2006). 
 91. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 506 n.3 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Court held that a public-school student who was a Jehovah’s 
Witness could not be compelled to recite the Pledge of Alle-
giance in school.92 The Court justified this conclusion on the 
ground that the government’s efforts at enforcing unifying, 
communal projects through law were to be feared, and “[a]s 
governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife 
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.”93 Govern-
ment orthodoxies enforced by compulsion always lead to con-
flict—even violent conflict—and ultimately, in the Court’s 
memorably dire warning, “the unanimity of the graveyard.”94 
The Barnette opinion represented a new commitment to abso-
lute anti-orthodoxy—the view that the government could have 
no say at all in assessing the communal value of speech. 
“Authority,” the Barnette Court said, “is to be controlled by 
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.”95 One should 
appreciate just how distant the Court’s absolute anti-orthodoxy 
rule is from the early American position on free speech. The 
latter clearly contemplated a vital and substantial role for gov-
ernment authority in the regulation of the natural right of 
speech, as well as considerable discretion in negotiating con-
flicts of individual freedom and public morality and welfare. 
The new position in Barnette purported to establish “public 
opinion” as the font of all orthodoxy in proclaiming that “[i]f 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”96 The state was now cut out altogether from making 
any evaluations of speech’s civic worth through regulation, re-
placed for these purposes by “public opinion.” Yet “public 
opinion” was itself not understood by the Barnette Court as a 
communal authority capable of prescribing general rules; free-
dom of speech instead entailed an absolute “intellectual indi-
vidualism” liberated from any governmental control.97 A 
pragmatic rule of absolute anti-orthodoxy as to the government 
                                                                                                                                         
 92. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 93. Id. at 641. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 641–42. 
 97. Id. 
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thus complemented and promoted the second wave conception 
of free speech as an entirely interior affair.98 
In the early years of the second wave, the democracy-
enhancing justification for free speech could still be discerned, 
though it was already greatly diminished. In Terminiello v. City 
of Chicago, for example, the Court overturned the conviction of 
a Catholic priest whose speech was intended to whip up a 
crowd inside an auditorium into a frenzy against a second 
crowd pressing to enter the auditorium and hurling bricks, 
rocks, bottles, and icepicks.99 The speech was laced with fascist 
epithets of hate and vilification aimed at particular classes and 
races of people. In an opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas 
characterized the quality of the speech at issue: 
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society 
depends on free discussion . . . . [I]t is only through free de-
bate and free exchange of ideas that government remains re-
sponsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is ef-
fected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of 
ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions 
that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. 
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute . . . . Speech is often provoca-
tive and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and precon-
ceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses 
for acceptance of an idea.100 
The passage is extraordinary inasmuch as Douglas—though 
using the first-wave rhetoric of democratic self-governance—
implied that this sort of speech is not merely the kind of politi-
cal dissent that must be tolerated, but that it is actually healthy 
for American democracy. That is, it is not the sort of ineffectu-
ally vicious speech that Holmes had sneered at in his Gitlow 
dissent101 (or that Justice Frankfurter, one year before Terminiel-
lo was decided, had deprecated as “[w]holly neutral futili-
ties”102) but a positive good for the democratic polity and a cen-
                                                                                                                                         
 98. Steven Smith has argued that the governmental anti-orthodoxy view of the 
First Amendment is untenable because successful governments always proclaim 
orthodoxies. Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 
625–28 (2003). 
 99. 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); id. at 15 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 4 (majority opinion). 
 101. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 102. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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tral concern of the First Amendment. Yet if inviting dispute in 
this fashion is the central function of free speech, then it seems 
to have far more to do with Terminiello’s own authority to do 
so in the manner of his choosing than with “free debate and 
free exchange of ideas” among the frenzied rabble to whom, 
and against whom, Terminiello’s self-expression was directed. 
Terminiello was empowered to establish his own “orthodoxy,” 
and the state, as Gerhart Niemeyer once put it, must 
acknowledge the “recognized truth” of the individual to say 
whatever he wills.103 
The Court’s more proximate first-wave invocations of 
speech’s power to shape public debate, or to enhance demo-
cratic governance, seem even less persuasive. The newer cases 
and their justifications instead involve the individual’s rights to 
be unconstrained in the exercise of his muscular right against 
the state to proclaim his antiorthodoxies. Perhaps Paul Robert 
Cohen intended to contribute to democratic self-government 
and the exchange of ideas in wearing a jacket with the words, 
“Fuck the Draft,” inside a courthouse corridor.104 Perhaps his 
expression was so received. But the terms in which the Court 
justified Cohen’s speech rights—the vindication of his “inex-
pressible emotions” that likely sound to those around him like 
a “verbal cacophony,” or to “lyric[ize]” in whatever vulgarities 
suited his “taste and style”—suggest that the Court’s true justi-
fication was not communal but individual.105 
Today, the second-wave approach to free speech predomi-
nates in the Supreme Court. The rise of autonomy-maximizing 
justifications has resulted in a massive expansion of the varie-
ties of speech that merit constitutional protection. The right of 
speech is conceived primarily as validating the autonomous 
self, and the Court largely has dispensed even with its prior 
honorific nods toward the democracy-enhancing function of 
speech protection. Speech that is “outrageous,”106 that is used 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. See Niemeyer, supra note 88, at 256. 
 104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
 105. Id. at 25–26; see also Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 310 (1991) (describing public expression as an “ele-
ment of several styles of life” and freedom of speech as an identification with a 
particular style). 
 106. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). 
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as an instrument of “aggression and personal assault,”107 that is 
cruel and sexually arousing because of the torture that it in-
flicts,108 that glories in the wanton slaughter of African-
Americans and Jews,109 that is personally abusive and intended 
to “inflict great pain”110—all are now protected by the First 
Amendment. 
The merging of the absolute anti-orthodoxy and individual-
istic justifications for free speech has become clearer as well. 
Recall that in the early Republic, speech by someone in bad 
faith could be outlawed, for there was no reason for parties to a 
social compact to protect lies or speech not made in good 
faith.111 Yet in 2012, the Court held in United States v. Alvarez 
that speech that is “an intended, undoubted lie” about a con-
crete fact—in this case, a lie about receiving the Congressional 
Medal of Honor, which had been proscribed by statute—and 
known to be so at the time spoken receives First Amendment 
protection.112 Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, justi-
fied this conclusion by recurring to the absolute anti-orthodoxy 
rationale that allowing the government to prohibit lying about 
the receipt of military honors would give it limitless authori-
ty—“a broad censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s 
cases”113—perhaps even leading to the sort of dystopian sur-
veillance state contemplated by George Orwell.114 
That pragmatic justification, however, was merely support-
ive of another justification: that Alvarez’s free and false speech 
is actually a positive social good, since, through the operation 
of counter-speech, it “can serve to reawaken and reinforce the 
public’s respect for the Medal, its recipients, and its high pur-
pose.”115 In a “free society,” the “remedy for speech that is false 
is speech that is true,”116 Justice Kennedy explained—a view 
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that might have been accepted at the founding but would not 
have exhausted the remedies on offer. But the Court has adopt-
ed it because, as it has explained in another context, the “fun-
damental rule of protection” of freedom of speech—the new 
core of freedom of speech—is “that a speaker has the autono-
my to choose the content of his own message.”117 
It is possible to characterize all of this newly protected 
speech as somehow contributing to the collective aim of demo-
cratic self-governance. Perhaps at some deeply subconscious 
level, it performs something like the “reawakening” function 
described by Justice Kennedy in Alvarez (though one might ask 
why it should always be desirable to invite persuasion about at 
least some of the issues in these cases). Yet to speak of Cohen’s 
speech, Westboro Baptist Church’s speech, Alvarez’s speech, 
Stevens’s speech, or EMA’s speech as speech that attempts to 
“persuade” others of some controversial position on a matter of 
public concern, as the Court sometimes does, seems implausi-
ble. If “persuasion” is defined, as David Strauss has argued, as 
“a process of appealing, in some sense, to reason,”118 then it 
verges on the farcical to suggest that animal crush videos, visu-
al depictions of the titillating slaughter of Black people and 
Jews, and lies about easily verifiable facts such as the earning 
of military honors perform this function. But First Amendment 
protection of speech of this kind does perform the function sim-
ultaneously of vindicating claims of individual recognition and 
self-actualization, supported by an overriding fear of govern-
ment-imposed orthodoxy. 
In expanding the ambit of free speech to encompass these in-
terests, the Court has had to eliminate any collective or extrin-
sic social interest in distinguishing between valuable and 
worthless speech. The two-track structure of the founding pe-
riod had to be dismantled. “The First Amendment itself,” the 
Court has claimed, “reflects a judgment by the American peo-
ple that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government out-
weigh the costs.”119 But that judgment is inconsistent with most 
of the history of free speech regulation in this country, in which 
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free speech rights were always closely tethered to limits reflect-
ing either legislative or (much later) judicial evaluations of the 
common good. The Court has reached this view in order to 
align its own holdings with its vastly expanded anti-orthodoxy 
justification for free speech. Justice Breyer noted in his EMA 
dissent that the Court’s decision was in fact arguably incon-
sistent with the aim of “rais[ing] future generations committed 
cooperatively to making our system of government work”120—
that is, with the cultivation of what had previously been the 
democracy-enhancing function (and limit) of absolute free 
speech protection. In this case, at least, Justice Breyer seems to 
be observing that the first wave of free speech expansion has 
been engulfed by the second. 
The second wave swept up not only the Court but many 
speech scholars as well, who increasingly championed the self-
authenticating, self-validating, identity-forming, Romantic ac-
count of freedom of speech. Thomas Emerson’s influential The 
System of Freedom of Expression was one of the earliest treat-
ments of freedom of speech as concerned primarily with “indi-
vidual self-fulfillment.”121 Steven Shiffrin has argued, against 
the Meiklejohnian position, that freedom of speech should 
shield all expressions (and not merely the political varieties) of 
“nonconformity,” and should “protect the romantics—those 
who would break out of classical forms: the dissenters, the un-
orthodox, [and] the outcasts.”122 Shiffrin’s account is useful in 
plotting the transition from a purely political to a more expan-
sively socio-cultural “preferred position” approach.123 Edwin 
Baker has emphasized that the core purpose of free speech was 
to protect the speaker’s “authority (or right) to make decisions 
about herself.”124 Seana Shiffrin has claimed that free speech 
protects the right of each “thinker” to “[b]ecom[e] a distinctive 
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individual,” “[r]espond[] authentically,” and fulfill her “inter-
est in being recognized by other agents for the person she is.”125 
But perhaps the seminal account of second-wave free speech 
protection is Martin Redish’s article, The Value of Free Speech, in 
which Redish went so far as to claim that the “one true value” 
of free speech is “individual self-realization” and that any other 
justification is ultimately a “subvalue[]” of this master value.126 
This was a fully liberal, autonomized account of free speech 
that self-consciously rejected any common ends or limits. To be 
a free American citizen means not to be controlled by others, 
but rather to control oneself127 and to be the sole and ultimate 
arbiter of the value of one’s own speech.128 
In an important article, Ted White described the transfor-
mation of free speech protection during this period as its “com-
ing of age.”129 White argued that the great expansion of speech 
protection as a unique type of right—a “constitutionally and 
culturally special” right130—rested on what he called the arrival 
of “modernism” to law, and specifically to the First Amend-
ment.131 This was the general view that humans were: 
“free” in the deepest sense: free to master and to control 
their own destinies. In holding this “freedom premise” they 
were rejecting a heritage of causative explanations for the 
universe that emphasized the power of external, nonhuman 
forces, ranging from God to nature to inexorable laws of po-
litical economy or social organization to determinist theories 
of historical change. For them a recognition of the subjectivi-
ty of perception and cognition meant much more than the 
belief that individual humans were capable of giving indi-
vidual meaning to their life experiences. It meant that hu-
                                                                                                                                         
 125. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 289–90 (2011). 
 126. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 
(1982). 
 127. See THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., CIVIC LIBERALISM: REFLECTIONS ON OUR 
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS ch. 5 (1999). 
 128. See Redish, supra note 126, at 629 (“[W]e have construed the first amend-
ment to leave to the individual final say as to how valuable the particular expres-
sion is.”). 
 129. White, supra note 8, at 309–10. 
 130. Id. at 308. 
 131. Id. at 309. 
778 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 42 
 
mans had the potential—the freedom—to alter those experi-
ences.132 
What White describes as features of “modernism,” others 
have characterized as those of “liberalism,” the liberation of 
humanity from the constraints of religion, association, preju-
dice, nature, and community custom or tradition.133 But which-
ever label is preferred, what stimulated the enormous expan-
sion of free speech rights was precisely a seemingly boundless 
faith in “the capacity of humans to master their experience and 
in effect to create their own destiny: it was a powerful affirma-
tion of the capacity and potential of the individual.”134 While 
the scope of free speech protection was, in the first wave of 
change, delimited by “empirical inquiry and rational policy-
making,” those influences rapidly fell away and were replaced 
by “individual dignity and choice” and its mirror-image justifi-
cation—absolute government anti-orthodoxy—as the philo-
sophical touchstones of speech protection.135 
White observes that the enormous expansion of speech rights 
in what I have called the second wave proved difficult to rec-
oncile with the aims of democratic self-governance, stimulating 
the arrival of new, retrenching, democracy-enhancing theories 
meant to realign speech protection along the modernist prem-
ises from which it had broken free.136 Hence, he writes that 
freedom of speech had been “sever[ed]” from “democratic the-
ory,” with all of its attendant rationalist and empiricist premis-
es betokening freedom of speech’s coming of age.137 
But this characterization misses two crucial points. First, the 
second wave followed from the first, the first having been itself 
a reaction against an earlier, much more strictly regulated 
speech regime designed to promote a thicker set of common 
ends governed by authorities outside the self. It was only be-
cause of the newly created absolute protection for “political” 
speech bestowed by the first wave—the “invention,” as Gene-
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vieve Lakier has put it, of a new category of “valuable” 
speech138—that the Court would eventually arrive at its much 
broader free speech absolutism in the second wave. Second, 
what the combination of the first and second waves accom-
plished was precisely to sever freedom of speech from serving 
any higher social or collective purposes. The waves together 
succeeded in fundamentally reorienting freedom of speech in-
wardly. 
Free speech, therefore, did not come of age in this period, at 
least if a coming of age is synonymous with maturity. Free 
speech was not, pace White, severed from the premises of mo-
dernity; it fulfilled those premises. And in so doing, it entered 
its adolescence, its developmental period of self-involvement, 
egocentrism, and emotional and behavioral independence. 
True, certain narrow categories of speech remain proscribed. 
But the justification for continuing to regulate, say, child por-
nography, incitement to violence, or “fighting words” does not 
depend upon their lack of fit within the second wave (they, too, 
may be justified on grounds of personal fulfillment and abso-
lute anti-orthodoxy), but on the vestigial view that some 
speech, even if self-fulfilling and deeply—even wildly—
unorthodox, is just too awful to tolerate.139 Free speech serves 
no other and greater end than the promotion and affirmation of 
the particular identity that a given individual cares to embrace, 
one that nobody else (neither God nor the political community 
acting through its government) could limit on the basis of its 
content. And this self-regarding, inward justification of free 
speech was in turn identified with the American national char-
acter.140 The Court and commentators now speak of free speech 
as a fundamental feature of the “dignity” of the speaker, by 
which they seem to mean the speaker’s sense of self-esteem or 
amour propre. 
Just as the general framework for religious liberty mirrored 
that of free speech in the early Republic,141 so, too, was religious 
freedom reconceived in parallel ways during this second peri-
od to reflect second-wave commitments—inwardness, solip-
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sism, and absolute autonomy and anti-orthodoxy. The law of 
religious accommodation, for example, incorporates many of 
these assumptions. True, the view that a core feature of reli-
gious free exercise depends upon premises of individual choice 
and voluntarism has deep roots in the American experience.142 
Yet the Court’s religious liberty cases beginning in the 1960s 
went well beyond an interest in voluntarism. Indeed, concerns 
that the free-exercise balancing test authorized a kind of hyper-
pluralized anarchy motivated the Court’s decision in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, where it returned to the pre-Sherbert v. 
Verner exemption regime.143 
But the passage of RFRA and RLUIPA, together with sundry 
state versions of RFRA, restored the self-centered approach as 
the primary test against which religious exemption claims are 
evaluated. These laws generally instruct courts to avoid inquir-
ies into the centrality of a belief—as, indeed, Smith itself had 
said.144 What is central is to be determined by the individual, 
not the religious community. Subjective perceptions of burdens 
may not be questioned because religious exercise is primarily 
understood as a matter of autonomous, individual choice—a 
choice that must be honored because it is personally “ful-
filling”145 and marks one’s distinctive human “identity.”146 Re-
quirements of a religious system of creedal commitments, in-
ternal consistency, and even rough alignment of beliefs with 
others within the religious community or group of which the 
claimant says he is a member all have been held out of order.147 
The Court has held that an individual’s beliefs need not corre-
spond at all with—indeed, may run directly contrary to—the 
beliefs of the religious group, community, or tradition with 
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which the individual claims to be associated.148 One could 
hardly imagine a more internally oriented freedom than reli-
gious liberty after these developments. 
On the establishment side, the situation is more complicated, 
but in many ways similar. Separation of church and state may 
be championed if it is perceived to support the autonomized, 
voluntarist conception of religious liberty and to strike at the 
historical and cultural connections between the American state 
and organized, corporate Christian traditions.149 But church-
state separation is far more controversial when it is perceived 
to immunize the corporate personhood of religious groups 
from government regulations forbidding discrimination on cer-
tain specific bases, especially sex and sexual orientation. In-
deed, the operation of broad, statutory free exercise and broad, 
constitutional establishment rules serves precisely to reorient 
religious freedom away from traditional religious institutions 
and groups and toward a view of religion as a set of ineffably 
subjective, inarticulable experiences, desires, and personal 
commitments, that cannot be touched at all, let alone ques-
tioned, by anyone. That perception of religion—as a changea-
ble set of fragmented and idiosyncratic views mirroring the 
self’s then-existing needs—is also reflected in the single-most 
rapidly growing religious constituency in the United States 
(particularly among millennials), the unaffiliated “Nones.”150 
With the arrival of the second wave reconceptualization of 
free speech (and its direct analogue in religious liberty), in sum, 
came the detachment of the substance of free speech—its con-
tent—from any collective aims and limits. The language of ab-
solute anti-orthodoxy seen in Barnette is a pragmatic expression 
of a similar view—that the government as a political communi-
ty is categorically disabled from making evaluations about 
speech’s worth because there is no longer any acceptable com-
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mon standard of evaluation. The right of free speech was deci-
sively detached from sources of authority outside the self and 
reoriented internally. That detachment resulted in the unparal-
leled expansion of free speech rights. It became, after the work 
of the second wave, a key symbol of American identity, though 
an identity that consisted in the rejection of any shared sub-
stantive political or social orthodoxies and commitments. 
III. PERIOD THREE: THE COMING OF THE CONSTRICTORS 
The inwardly oriented, absolute anti-orthodoxy First 
Amendment of the second period has been a spectacular suc-
cess. At no time has the right of free speech been more power-
ful than it is today. The last hundred years truly have been the 
“free speech century.”151 But free speech’s very successes have 
rendered it vulnerable to increasingly numerous apprehen-
sions, objections, and attacks. The absence of any acceptable, 
extrinsic criteria for challenging any conception of freedom of 
speech also has meant that there have been no acceptable, ex-
trinsic criteria for validating any conception of it. 
As the earlier, two-tiered structure of the core and periphery 
of free speech protection was dismantled, critics became con-
scious of free speech’s lack of any common moral direction. 
And they despaired of its hollowness, its separation from any 
value transcending the self, and its complete detachment from 
any account of the public good. These new anxieties marked 
the advent of the sickness unto death of the First Amendment. 
What good was free speech if it did not sub-serve any particu-
lar politics? If the point of free speech was to pursue the 
“truth” as an “ultimate good,” as Holmes argued in his Abrams 
dissent152 and as many others had also claimed, then little point 
in it remained if the exchange of ideas could never yield some 
result relevant to truth. After the second wave, every untruth 
was treated as a potential truth, and every truth as a potential 
untruth; freedom of speech had been disconnected from any 
notion of Holmes’s “ultimate good.” The political theorist Ger-
hart Niemeyer once predicted that when this should happen, 
the people would “in mortal fright embrace any ideological 
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substitute that happens to present itself in a plausible dis-
guise.”153 
Yet the hypertrophy of freedom of speech did not occur in a 
vacuum. The First Amendment may have suffered the sickness 
unto death, but its illness ran its course alongside the creation 
of other rights and interests derived from other provisions of 
the Constitution. Just at the time when the Court was swelling 
freedom of speech during the second wave and draining it of 
any shared communal standards for validating the substance of 
speech, it was also discovering new rights of dignity, equality, 
autonomy, and sexual freedom in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The progress of the obscenity or sexually suggestive speech 
cases of the twentieth century are a useful example. Scholars 
have noted the connection between the ACLU’s advocacy of 
enlarged speech protection and its promotion of “sex as a civil 
liberty” in constitutional litigation in the 1930s and 1940s.154 By 
the 1960s, the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence 
had caught up, establishing unenumerated rights of privacy 
grounding access to birth control (first for married couples,155 
then for individuals156) as well as preventing the state—on free 
speech grounds—from regulating the private possession of ob-
scene material.157 Gradually, as Leigh Ann Wheeler has ob-
served, the Court was persuaded that the “sanctity of freedom 
of speech and sexual privacy” stood at “the very core of Amer-
ican constitutionalism,” rendering them mutually reinforcing 
rights.158 
True, later obscenity cases implicating other ideals and inter-
ests—including the equality of the sexes, human dignity, and 
what were thought to be intolerable collateral costs—checked 
some of the progress of sexual libertarianism in the Court’s ear-
lier jurisprudence. Cases including Miller v. California159 and 
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New York v. Ferber,160 allowing for somewhat greater state regu-
lation of obscenity and holding child pornography to be unpro-
tected by the First Amendment, showed that there were rele-
vant competing values of equality and dignity at stake. 
Advocacy organizations like the ACLU noticed; the emerging 
tensions between expanding rights of sexual freedom and 
broader egalitarian and dignitarian ideals had the effect of 
moderating the ACLU’s sexual libertarianism so as to parry 
accusations, for example, that it was “privileging men’s over 
women’s rights and liberty over equality.”161 
Nevertheless, and these complications aside, the main cur-
rents of autonomy, dignity, and equality coexisted harmoni-
ously in the majority of the Court’s twentieth century substan-
tive due process and speech jurisprudence, whether the issue 
was reproductive rights,162 gay rights,163 or other sexual libera-
tions more directly implicating expressive freedom.164 In this 
way, rights of free speech and rights of sexual equality, dignity, 
and liberty became mutually supportive, just at the moment 
when the right of free speech was swelling and turning inward 
in the later stages of the second wave. Both reflected an abso-
lute, or near-absolute, privileging of certain rights (whether of 
speech or of sexual autonomy) as against communal interfer-
ence. Although the project of the second wave was to empty 
freedom of speech of any external criterion—any transcendent 
source outside the self, including the democratic polity as a 
whole—against which to measure the substantive worth of 
speech, the hollowing out of free speech created space for its 
reinfusion with new ends and new limits. These came primari-
ly, though not exclusively, from leading cases in the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurispru-
dence. 
It is these new rights and interests that promised to cure the 
First Amendment’s sickness unto death. These rights and inter-
                                                                                                                                         
 160. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 161. WHEELER, supra note 154, at 179–80. 
 162. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 163. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 164. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
No. 3] Sickness unto Death of the First Amendment 785 
 
ests could revitalize the First Amendment with what were 
claimed to be new, extrinsically, communally ordered and de-
limited ends. Academic and judicial arguments for First 
Amendment constriction—whether for religious or speech 
freedom—developed in order to protect, entrench, and ad-
vance these new ends. When constituencies that did not share, 
or that set themselves in opposition to, the new preferred ends 
invoke the expansive protections of freedom of speech’s second 
wave to resist them, they are now met with arguments that the 
First Amendment is not meant for their claims, but to protect 
higher common purposes. 
A. Academic Constrictors 
The scholarly literature advocating new free speech limits in 
the service of ostensibly common ends is vast and growing, 
and this article cannot hope to canvass every development.165 It 
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may instead be more useful to describe the trajectory of certain 
more prominent arguments. 
One of the most interesting scholars of the new constriction 
is Steven Shiffrin, in significant part because Shiffrin’s work 
marks the transition from the second wave expansion of free 
speech to constriction today. Shiffrin argued in his 1990 book 
The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance that the core of 
freedom of speech protected the individual’s “right to speak 
about any subject and that it most especially guaranteed the 
right to dissent against existing customs, habits, conventions, 
processes, and institutions.”166 At the time, Shiffrin framed his 
claim as a criticism of first-wave reformers like Meiklejohn, 
who had argued much more narrowly for the democracy-
enhancing view of speech protection but also the limits of more 
expansive speech protection for non-political speech. 
Shiffrin’s project was to explode those Meiklejohnian limits: 
all speech representing “nonconformi[ty]” should be protected 
at least by balancing it against competing social values, any 
“paeans to democracy and self-government” notwithstand-
ing.167 This already represented a major expansion of speech 
protection. One of Shiffrin’s primary examples of “dissent” 
concerned the use of offensive profanity—as in George Carlin’s 
well-known monologue of “Filthy Words”—and the Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold the FCC’s sanction of profanity as 
“too vulgar and too offensive for the radio.”168 For Shiffrin, pro-
fanity of this kind was “precisely what the first amendment is 
supposed to protect. Carlin is attacking conventions; assaulting 
the prescribed orthodoxy; mocking the stuffed shirts . . . .”169 
One could hardly conceive of a more committedly anti-
orthodoxy, expansive position, though a position that still con-
ceded that some interests (inciting imminent lawless action, for 
example) could override free speech interests. 
Yet just over two decades later, Shiffrin’s view had altered 
substantially. In his Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture, 
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Shiffrin still argued in favor of a balancing approach that 
weighed the value of free speech against other rights and inter-
ests.170 But the balance had now changed. Some form of abso-
lutism had once been necessary, Shiffrin argued, as a “reac-
ti[on] against puritanical censorship and the political witch 
hunting of the McCarthy era.”171 But today, Shiffrin claimed 
that an approach “that accommodates the First Amendment 
interests against the interests of concern to the government”—
that is, a balancing test that favors social and communal inter-
ests much more systematically than in the past—ought to be 
adopted.172 
Shiffrin’s views thus migrated from an expansive justifica-
tion for free speech emphasizing powerful protection for “as-
sault” on any “orthodoxy,” no matter how necessary that or-
thodoxy may be from the perspective of the political 
community, to a balancing test that weighted social and com-
munal interests much more heavily. He now says that protect-
ing and promoting some forms of “human dignity” may out-
weigh the value of free speech.173 In discussing the animal-
crush video case, United States v. Stevens,174 Shiffrin criticizes 
the treatment and consumption of animals in America as mor-
ally problematic, and charges that consumers of animal crush 
videos are “sick and twisted.”175 Likewise, as to Snyder v. 
Phelps,176 in which the Westboro Baptist Church protested the 
United States by chanting anti-gay invective near an American 
soldier’s funeral, Shiffrin writes that “a society unwilling to 
protect mourners at a funeral from verbal assaults of this kind 
has lost its way.”177 It has, in Shiffrin’s view, “committed the sin 
of First Amendment idolatry” because it has pitted freedom of 
speech against “human dignity.”178 “American democracy,” 
too, has been violated by expansive free speech rights now that 
                                                                                                                                         
 170. See Shiffrin, supra note 165, at 1482. 
 171. Id. at 1485. 
 172. Id. at 1488. 
 173. Id. at 1489. 
 174. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 175. See Shiffrin, supra note 165, at 1489. 
 176. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 177. Shiffrin, supra note 165, at 1496. 
 178. Id. 
788 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 42 
 
corporations can speak freely;179 this is the “dark side” of the 
First Amendment.180 What Shiffrin once decried as the overly 
restrictive democracy-enhancing justification for free speech, 
he now embraces as a necessary limit. 
Shiffrin never explains precisely what accounts for the radi-
cal shift in emphasis from once advocating an inwardly orient-
ed, orthodoxy-smashing, expansive freedom of speech to 
speaking in the theologically charged language of First 
Amendment “sins” and “idolatry,” as well as recommending 
the balancing of speech rights against dignitarian and democ-
racy-enhancing interests. The Westboro Baptist Church’s views 
may indeed be unpalatable, but they are also certainly dissent-
ing, offensive, and politically countercultural. Twenty-five 
years ago, it would have been unthinkable for Shiffrin to argue 
that the First Amendment did not protect Carlin, the political 
dissenter. Carlin’s speech was necessary to smash the puritani-
cal idols. Why is not Westboro Baptist Church the new Carlin, 
smashing today’s idols? 
Yet Shiffrin is not alone. Many other scholars have also ar-
gued vigorously for these and other constrictions of free 
speech—limitations that presuppose widely shared political 
ends such as a common commitment to “dignity” or “equali-
ty,” a particular view about the proper workings of “democra-
cy,” the prevention of “third-party harm,” the preservation and 
extension of rights of sexual autonomy, or even a specifically 
partisan political program that sound altogether different than 
the second-wave view of the First Amendment. 
Some scholars frame their arguments for speech constriction 
in overtly partisan terms. Burt Neuborne, once a staunch advo-
cate of the civil libertarian freedom of speech, now argues that 
while progressives once promoted extremely broad speech 
rights in the service of progressive causes, the extension of such 
rights to conservatives has led many “progressives” to “suspect 
they had made a bad First Amendment bargain.”181 “Civil liber-
ties once were radical,” writes the legal historian Laura Wein-
rib, but the dream of a radically progressive and liberated poli-
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tics was never fulfilled by expansive free speech rights.182 Louis 
Michael Seidman laments that free speech can never truly be 
“weaponized” to advance and entrench progressive ends be-
cause the freedom is “too deeply rooted in ideas about fixed 
property rights.”183 Instead, progressives who long for “an ac-
tivist government that strives to achieve the public good” 
should simply pursue those ends directly and constrict free 
speech for use only “as a side constraint” on the achievement 
of a truly radical progressive politics.184 
Not all academic speech constrictors argue in such una-
bashed partisan terms. Oftentimes, the language of “balancing” 
is used, together with the enumeration of somewhat under-
specified social interests claimed to be of great communal val-
ue. Consider Alexander Tsesis’s claim that the rights of free 
speech must be balanced against other community interests in 
“equality, dignity, creativity, and public peace.”185 Tsesis goes 
on to say that the right of free speech must be reattached to 
“the broader constitutional value of equal dignity secured by a 
system of government whose aim should be the common 
good.”186 Likewise, in a careful and interesting paper arguing 
for “free speech consequentialism,” Erica Goldberg argues for a 
fundamental re-orientation in free speech law that would 
weigh the benefits of free speech against its costs, analogizing 
certain sorts of speech to physical acts of violence—including 
those that involve “revenge” pornography (but not pornogra-
phy proper).187 Goldberg writes that she undertakes this pro-
posal for reform “with the aim of rehabilitating core values of 
our First Amendment doctrine and practice,”188 and yet these 
core values are neither self-evident nor perhaps widely shared. 
Yet other scholars speak about rights and interests in equali-
ty that are also claimed to be fully or relevantly “democratic.” 
Perhaps the earliest and best known of these is Cass Sunstein, 
who argued that freedom of speech should be interpreted so as 
                                                                                                                                         
 182. LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES 
COMPROMISE 1, 9 (2016). 
 183. Seidman, supra note 165, at 2219. 
 184. Id. at 2220–21. 
 185. Tsesis, supra note 165, at 16. 
 186. Id. at 20. 
 187. Goldberg, supra note 165, at 687. 
 188. Id. 
790 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 42 
 
to promote “political equality” and “political deliberation,” 
which should include a “New Deal” for speech in which Con-
gress should suppress speech that has “distorting effects” on 
true democracy.189 Several other scholars have followed some-
thing like this line more recently. The government must protect 
and promote the “free and equal citizenship” of Americans and 
their “democratic values,” argues Corey Brettschneider, not by 
criminally punishing “hateful viewpoints,” but instead by en-
gaging in the ostensibly softer censures and inducements of 
“persuasion.”190 The state can and should nudge along those 
groups that do not accept its view of what “free and equal citi-
zenship” requires; its objective should include, for example, the 
“transformation of discriminatory religious beliefs” into some-
thing more civically healthy.191 David Pozen and Jeremy Kess-
ler likewise “search for an egalitarian First Amendment,”192 ar-
guing that a series of “midlevel conceptual and jurisprudential 
moves”193—which include strategic minimalism and maximal-
ism to advance progressive ends, as well as the legal recogni-
tion of “expressive interests . . . downstream” of the speaker—
can be used to reorient the First Amendment in what they re-
gard as civically healthy directions.194 Similarly, Nelson Tebbe 
also argues in an egalitarian register that the political good of 
“full and equal citizenship” requires certain distinctive limits 
on First Amendment rights, whether of speech or religion.195 
In some cases, echoes of the early American period in the 
claims of constrictors are startlingly direct. Morgan Weiland 
claims that free speech law assumes a two-tiered structure, 
with a libertarian “periphery” and a liberal-republican 
“core.”196 The latter is threatened by the libertarian expansion 
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of free speech in which corporations are granted speech rights, 
because while individuals have “an innate capacity for self-
expression and self-realization,” corporations do not and cor-
porate rights end up diminishing individual rights.197 
Weiland’s claims about a distinctive “libertarian tradition” that 
sprung into being in the 1970s, and her view that this tradition 
can be confined to cases involving “corporate” rights, are de-
batable. As this Article has shown, the second-wave, individu-
ally-oriented, libertarian expansion of freedom of speech de-
cried by Weiland and many others is a much older 
phenomenon extending as far back as the early twentieth cen-
tury, and in its earlier years it promoted progressive political 
ends. The division she creates between corporate and individ-
ual free speech protection may not pinpoint the true source and 
scope of the conceptual change to which she objects.198 But the 
more important point is Weiland’s insistence on a two-tiered 
structure of “core” and “peripheral” speech rights, with the 
core encompassing communally oriented “republican” values 
concerning “collective self-determination.”199 The core interests 
of the collective community as she perceives them are set 
against the peripheral rights of free speech, and particularly 
corporate speech. It is a view that mimics the two-tiered struc-
ture, though of course not the substance, of early republican 
views of free speech almost exactly. 
As in each of the two previous periods, there are parallels for 
the right of religious freedom. Here, academic constrictors have 
instead generally focused on the idea that rights of religious 
freedom recall the specter (it always is a specter and never a 
pleasant memory) of Lochner v. New York200 or that they gener-
ate social harms of various kinds to third parties—frequently 
harms that threaten the new sexual rights conceived by the 
Court in its substantive due process jurisprudence and stabi-
lized in subsequent legislation. Rights of religious freedom 
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therefore must be constricted accordingly, they argue, so as to 
protect and entrench these more important, common ends. 
Elizabeth Sepper, for example, charges that rights of reli-
gious freedom often threaten vital social interests in “[s]ex 
equality and public health” in the same way that Lochner and 
its progeny threatened salubrious social and economic poli-
cies.201 Similarly, the vital social good of “antidiscrimination 
protections”—and particularly those dealing with sexual liber-
ties—is threatened by broad rights of religious liberty; the latter 
should accordingly be curtailed when they run up against 
these other more important rights, especially when antidis-
crimination law has the capacity to vindicate interests in per-
sonal dignity.202 
The disparaging comments by Sepper and others who take a 
similarly critical line about Lochner are perplexing. They evince 
a deep misunderstanding of what the Lochner era was all about. 
Substantive due process in the style of Lochner was meant to 
ensure that the government was properly pursuing the public 
good, rather than invidiously or arbitrarily depriving individu-
als of their liberty. Even the reviled Plessy v. Ferguson, a deci-
sion of the Lochner period, insisted that “every exercise of the 
police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws 
as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public 
good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular 
class.”203 Lochner itself adopts a similar approach, balancing the 
broad police powers of the state for the protection of the com-
munity against individual liberties to arrive at what the Court 
thought were “reasonable” compromises.204 The formalism of 
the opinion in Lochner should not be mistaken for a more con-
temporary, libertarian view of individual rights. 
Modern substantive due process doctrine, like modern free 
speech and religious freedom doctrine, is by contrast struc-
tured as an effort to identify particularly fundamental liberty 
interests that cannot be regulated collectively even under a law 
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the common good. It 
is this absolutist approach to speech and substantive due pro-
cess rights that is the outlier. The claims of scholars like Sepper 
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and others who invoke Lochner as a legal hobgoblin are actually 
very similar in structure to the arguments of the Lochner peri-
od.205 They are today’s Lochnerizers, though they bring very 
different substantive visions of the common good to their work 
than did judges of the Lochner era. Indeed, it is they who insist 
on the demotion of First Amendment rights to interests that 
should be balanced in accordance with the public good against 
other interests they may think are more valuable. They have 
simply substituted a different baseline of political commit-
ments for Lochner’s, while taking on board all of the solicitude 
and formalism for their baseline that Lochner did for its own 
very different one. 
A final group of academic constrictors invokes claims of 
harm to third parties as limitations on First Amendment 
rights.206 These voices are particularly useful in cataloguing the 
new First Amendment constriction because “third-party harm” 
is a sufficiently capacious term to encompass a staggeringly 
broad array of putatively rivalrous interests. Indeed, third-
party harms constrictors are sometimes vague about the kinds 
of harms that ought to serve as limits on First Amendment 
rights, and this imprecision is entirely sensible if the view is 
that the government should have far greater latitude in balanc-
ing rights of religious liberty and free speech against other col-
lective social interests thought by these scholars to be of greater 
worth.207 
Several prominent third-party harm constrictors do specify, 
however, that harm to “dignity” should defeat claims of reli-
gious freedom. Although Shiffrin used the term “dignity” to 
signal interests implicating animal rights and grieving at a fu-
neral, these constrictors seem generally to mean rival interests 
involving sexual liberties of various kinds.208 Thus, for exam-
ple, Reva Siegel and Douglas Nejaime write that denials of 
cost-free contraceptive coverage on the basis of claims of reli-
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gious scruple, and their accommodation through law, are deep-
ly injurious to individual dignity because they “stigmatize and 
demean” those whose own sexual morality deviates from “tra-
ditional sexual morality.”209 Indeed, these harms are claimed to 
be so serious that accommodating any contrary religious inter-
est might itself be a violation of the First Amendment. “Digni-
ty” has become a kind of totem for constriction—a symbol that 
encompasses a miscellany of interests thought to outweigh 
rights of speech and religious freedom. 
For purposes of this Article, the critical point is not to evalu-
ate these, or any other, constricting proposals. It is that scholars 
of constriction are increasingly hearkening—wittingly or not—
to the early American framework in calling for the political 
community (working through its government) to delimit free 
speech and religious freedom rights in the service of the public 
good. The justifications for that constriction are, just as in the 
early Republic, claimed to lie in the core or root goods of the 
American democratic community. Today, however, these core 
goods often are derived from the Court’s substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence, and in particular its decisions about sex as a 
civil right. Academic constrictors of the First Amendment claim 
that these common American political values—whether de-
fined in terms of democracy, dignity, equality, sexual freedom, 
third-party harm, or simply as an explicitly politically partisan 
program—must be balanced against any rights to free speech 
and religious freedom. 
B. Judicial Constrictors 
Judges have also recently argued for the constriction of First 
Amendment freedoms. Like their academic counterparts, judg-
es explicitly invoke “democracy” and “dignity” as rightly im-
posing limits on free speech, though what precisely they mean 
by these terms can be as opaque as when first-wave reformers 
made similar claims about democracy.210 In last year’s Supreme 
Court term, four Justices signed two dissenting opinions each 
of which decried the “weaponiz[ation]” of free speech by the 
majority, and it should come as no surprise that one of these 
cases involved what was perceived as a threat to abortion 
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rights.211 Judges, too, raise the ghost of Lochner in what is meant 
to be a disparaging analogy.212 But unlike scholarly con-
striction, judicial constriction at present tends to be a dissenting 
view, at least at the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, at least five 
different Justices on the present Court have endorsed argu-
ments for constriction, though to date never in the same case. 
The phenomenon of judicial constriction at the Court may be 
strengthening. 
One of the earliest judicial constrictors on the contemporary 
Court was Justice John Paul Stevens, who emphasized in his 
well-known dissent in Citizens United v. FEC that “society could 
scarcely function,” if every public interest were “an illegitimate 
basis for qualifying a speaker’s autonomy.”213 The “corporate 
domination of politics,” he argued, was a distinctive and grave 
threat to “democratic integrity,” one which had been recog-
nized from “the inception of the republic.”214 Corporations 
should not have free speech rights, he claimed, and regulations 
of them impinge on no true interests in “autonomy, dignity, or 
political equality,”215 which are the fundamental values served 
by free speech. Stevens framed his argument for constriction 
exactly as an appeal to the promotion of a “broader notion of 
the public good”216—distinctive ideas about republican gov-
ernment that explicitly draw on the Founders’ conception of 
free speech and that are disserved by granting corporations 
speech rights. 
Justice Alito has also advocated free speech constriction, 
which may suggest that judicial constriction does not map per-
fectly onto any particular political preference or orientation. 
Alito’s dissenting opinions in Snyder v. Phelps217 and United 
States v. Alvarez218 argue that the Court should engage in some 
kind of evaluation of the “value” of free speech, and that cer-
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tain types of speech “have no value,”219 “inflict real harm,”220 or 
are “vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public 
debate.”221 His dissent in United States v. Stevens222 argues for an 
extension of New York v. Ferber, which had held that child por-
nography receives no free speech protection,223 to depictions of 
animal torture and dismemberment, which likewise “have by 
definition no appreciable social value.”224 His concurrence in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association225 contended that 
violent video games may well be different in kind from other 
media with respect to their potential social harm to “troubled 
teens,” and that the Court should have left open the possibility 
of balancing such harms against free speech rights in future 
cases.226 
All of these opinions by Justice Alito reflect an approach that 
would have the Court constrict freedom of speech in its present 
sprawling form to account for competing social interests in de-
cency and especially harm to third parties.227 All reflect an em-
phasis on the exchange of politically and socially worthwhile 
ideas (“public debate”)—to be distinguished from worthless 
ones—as freedom of speech’s principal object. Yet all also as-
sume contested ideas of what counts as “valuable” and “harm-
ful” speech—assumptions that are difficult to reconcile with 
the right of free speech after its second wave expansion. 
Most recently, the Court has decided two cases indicating 
that a growing bloc on the Court favors more thoroughgoing 
free speech constriction. In arguing for constriction, the four-
justice dissents in both cases accused the majority of “weapon-
izing” free speech, and both invoked “democracy” and the 
“true value” of freedom of speech in justifying that con-
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striction. It should come as little surprise that one of the two 
cases involved abortion rights on one side and conservative 
Christian beliefs about abortion on the other. The opinions in 
these cases suggest—with both their rhetoric and their substan-
tive disagreements with their respective majorities—that the 
war between free speech constrictors and second-wave expan-
sionists is likely to intensify. 
In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, the 
Court reviewed a challenge to California regulations imposed 
on pro-life pregnancy resource centers.228 One required state-
licensed centers to advertise the availability of state-subsidized 
abortion, while a second required unlicensed centers to notify 
women prominently and in several languages that they were 
not licensed.229 The law manifested an intent to target “largely 
Christian belief-based” centers,230 which California state legisla-
tors believed were not sufficiently “forward thinking” about 
abortion, as recorded in the statute’s legislative history.231 
In a 5-4 opinion, Justice Thomas held that the statute violated 
freedom of speech because its provisions compelled the centers 
to express content-specific messages, including about obtaining 
the very service to which the centers objected—abortion.232 Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued 
that the regulations were intended to squelch the pro-life views 
of the centers: “[I]t is not forward thinking to force individuals 
to ‘be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideo-
logical point of view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.’”233 
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, 
and Sotomayor. If a state may require an abortion provider to 
tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services (as 
the Court had held in Planned Parenthood v. Casey234), Breyer ar-
gued, it should also be able to require pro-life centers to tell a 
woman about the availability of state-subsidized abortion.235 
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But the dissent went much further, charging that the majority 
had empowered pro-life centers “to use the Constitution as a 
weapon” to defeat “ordinary economic and social legisla-
tion.”236 The true value of free speech, wrote Breyer, is only 
“obscure[d], not clarif[ied]” by invoking it in an 
“[in]appropriate case” like this—a situation where state offi-
cials were simply doing their best to protect the health and 
safety of their people.237 “Even during the Lochner era,” said 
Breyer, the “Court was careful to defer to state legislative 
judgments concerning the medical profession.”238 In the dis-
sent’s view, the Court’s holding in NIFLA was more egregious 
than those of the Lochner era itself. 
In the other case, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, the Court struck down an Illinois law 
that compelled non-members to pay public-sector union fees.239 
The Court reversed Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,240 which 
had held that compulsory public-sector agency fees were con-
stitutional, so long as the money was used only for activities 
“germane” to collective bargaining rather than for separate 
“political and ideological projects.”241 In an opinion for the 
Court by Justice Alito on behalf of the same five-Justice majori-
ty as in NIFLA, the Court held that these compulsory union 
fees forced support (in the form of financial subsidies) for mes-
sages with which the litigants disagreed, and Abood’s distinc-
tion between permissible and impermissible expenditures had 
proved easier to articulate than apply.242 
As in Justice Breyer’s NIFLA dissent, Justice Kagan’s Janus 
dissent accused the majority of “weaponizing” freedom of 
speech and “unleash[ing] judges” to ravage salutary, democrat-
ically validated policies.243 Kagan denounced the justices in the 
majority as “black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices” 
and censured them for “turning the First Amendment into a 
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sword.”244 “The First Amendment,” she argued, “was meant for 
better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect 
democratic governance . . . .”245 
Kagan’s Janus dissent is probably the strongest example of 
judicial constriction to date. The function of freedom of speech, 
in her view, is not to override certain sorts of healthy or valua-
ble democratic choices of the kind made by state officials in NI-
FLA and Janus. Rather, individual rights like free speech should 
reinforce and promote this sort of “democratic governance” in 
furtherance of the public good—the “better things” that Cali-
fornia and Illinois had wisely given their people—and judicial 
oversight in these kinds of cases sets the Court on the “long 
road” to juristocracy. 
“Black-robed,” as a term of abuse, was first used by Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in United States v. Windsor, to describe the 
Court’s arrogation to itself of the power to strike down the De-
fense of Marriage Act—a decision that Kagan joined—on the 
basis that the statute restricting marriage for federal purposes 
to two members of the opposite sex ran afoul of the Court’s 
substantive due process sexual liberties jurisprudence.246 Kagan 
almost certainly intentionally echoed Scalia, though it seems 
plain that her views of sound and unsound social policies, and 
of the circumstances in which the Court legitimately overturns 
democratic choices, are rather different than Scalia’s. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the rhetorical warfare of the NIFLA and Janus 
dissenters, both of these decisions do showcase the Court’s en-
during embrace of second-wave free speech expansionism—
the dominant conceptual framework for roughly a century. Yet 
if this conception of free speech is today serving conservative 
ends, as Breyer, Kagan, and the other dissenters who joined 
them charge, one should recall that for many decades it pro-
moted progressive ends in the Court’s cases involving defama-
tion, obscenity, sexually explicit speech, and other twentieth 
century expansions of free speech.247 
The metaphor of First Amendment “weaponization” that 
was deployed in both cases was minted a few years ago to at-
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tack religious freedom, when Burwell v. Hobby Lobby248 was the 
case that evoked so much outrage.249 The metaphor is effective 
because it re-characterizes certain kinds of exercises of religious 
liberty—particularly those that are believed to threaten the new 
rights of sexual liberty and autonomy—as violence, similar to 
the way that some academic constrictors argue that speech may 
sometimes function as an act of violence.250 It was and remains 
a technique of those using the image of weaponry and violence 
to refer to “religious freedom” as against “civil rights,” the as-
sumption being that religious freedom is not also a civil 
right.251 Some academic constrictors are inclined to use the 
metaphor of First Amendment weaponry positively, in advo-
cating for aggressively partisan uses of free speech.252 Some 
continue to decry any uses of religious freedom that they dis-
like as “weaponization.”253 But until the 2017 Supreme Court 
term, the metaphor had not appeared in any Supreme Court 
opinion.254 
But it is not an unexpected development. The sickness unto 
death of the First Amendment—the dissatisfaction and anxiety 
that resulted from its disconnection from any overarching idea 
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of the public political and moral good transcending the self, 
just as the right was swelling to an unprecedented scope—has 
brought on a powerful reaction. The First Amendment constric-
tors argue that new values, derived from new rights and inter-
ests in dignity, equality, democracy, third-party harm, and oth-
ers, must be balanced against the freedoms of speech and reli-
religion. These values were generated and entrenched in part 
by the hypertrophic First Amendment itself. These new inter-
ests poured in to fill up the void created by free speech’s sec-
ond wave reformers. For the constrictors, these new rights and 
interests are the cure for the sickness unto death, inasmuch as 
they reunite freedom of speech with, as Justice Kagan put it, 
the “better things”—the public good, and perhaps even 
Holmes’s “ultimate good”255—of American political and moral 
life. 
IV. THE UNITY OF SPEECH AND RELIGION 
It is an open question whether arguments for First Amend-
ment constriction will ultimately prove successful in constitu-
tional law and elsewhere. They may well be adopted at some 
point by a majority of the Supreme Court, though to date they 
have persuaded only a quorum of dissenters. Given the deeply 
fractured state of American political life, and in the wake of the 
political wreckage that has followed the second wave expan-
sion of free speech, one might well believe that imposing new 
limits on First Amendment rights in the name of dignity, de-
mocracy, equality, sexual freedom, third-party harm, progres-
sivism, or any of the other purposes championed by the new 
constrictors is far likelier to exacerbate social and civic frag-
mentation than to reconstitute it. On the other hand, perhaps at 
this point any course of action—whether constriction or con-
tinued expansion of First Amendment rights—is likelier to re-
sult in further fracture than greater civic unity. 
Whatever the future may hold, the rights of free speech and 
religious liberty are likely to suffer similar fates. This Article 
has shown how at each of the principal periods of their respec-
tive development—in the early Republic, during the twentieth 
century dual-wave expansion, and today—the justifications for 
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and limitations on these two rights have proceeded in tandem. 
From the two-tiered natural rights framework of the eigteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, to the inwardly oriented, absolute 
anti-orthodoxy explosion of the second wave in the twentieth 
century, to contemporary arguments for constriction in the ser-
vice of a putative democratic common good, it is in fact re-
markable that the progress of these two American rights has 
proceeded nearly, and with only some exceptions, pari passu. 
Some scholars see things differently. For example, in a subtle 
article that compares the cultural power of the right of religious 
freedom against other First Amendment rights including free 
speech and association, John Inazu argues that various Ameri-
can sociological developments, including the declining religios-
ity of Americans, at least as respects traditional religions, and 
the sense that religious liberty has been captured by specific 
ideological constituencies, may weaken the right of religious 
liberty in ways that may not affect other First Amendment 
rights.256 Inazu contends that “with enough reflection,” people 
may be willing to acknowledge the value of associational and 
speech freedoms even for those with whom they disagree, in 
ways that may be more difficult or unavailing when it comes to 
religious freedom.257 
In other work, I have voiced some doubts about Inazu’s view 
on the ground that in a society in which the government takes 
on an increasingly large role in the life of the citizenry, the pro-
tection of rights becomes a zero-sum game.258 Every inch won 
is a gain for individual rights like that of religious freedom, 
and every inch lost is a gain for the state. This dynamic should, 
in time, affect all rights, very much including the right of free 
speech, because the key issue is not evolving cultural percep-
tions of any given right’s strength and ambit, but evolving cul-
tural perceptions of the strength and ambit of the state’s proper 
power. 
But the conclusions of this paper offer a separate, historical 
reason for skepticism about Inazu’s view concerning the differ-
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ential power of rights of religious and speech freedom. The 
fundamental frameworks within which these rights are situat-
ed, and the shared assumptions that have influenced common-
ly accepted views about their justifications and limits, run to-
gether across the history of their development. The early 
Republic was informed by the natural rights framework; the 
twentieth century by modernism and liberalism; and today 
perhaps a new structural and theoretical framework is emerg-
ing in the claims of the constrictors. 
Rights of free speech and religious freedom are generally in-
voked by the discontents and dissidents in these regimes—
those who reject or at least stand to one side of the dominant 
cultural orthodoxies and frameworks. And those who embrace 
the dominant frameworks of any given era are likely to oppose 
vigorously claims of First Amendment rights that obstruct or 
impede the progress and entrenchment of those frameworks. 
Some scholars have suggested that the warring frameworks are 
in essence theological. They represent the clash between theo-
logically orthodox and theologically liberal positions—between 
worldviews that diverge radically about whether individuals 
should, as Ted White put it, be “‘free’ in the deepest sense: free 
to master and to control their own destinies”259 or whether in-
dividuals should instead derive knowledge and meaning from 
received authority and tradition.260 
In a society in which theological and political liberals may 
have understood themselves to be an oppressed minority, the 
second wave expansion of free speech rights, together with the 
individualized turn of religious freedom rights, would have 
been very valuable to resist what were then more prevalent or-
thodox views. Indeed, the “anti-orthodoxy” component of the 
second wave expansion of free speech rights in cases like Bar-
nette and others—far from serving the neutral function claimed 
for it—would instead disrupt and destabilize existing, ortho-
dox traditions of authority, thought, and opinion. But once 
theological liberals began to displace the existing orthodoxies 
with their own, the anti-orthodox First Amendment was no 
longer needed. Anti-orthodoxy had become the new ortho-
doxy, and the old arguments became positively harmful to the 
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protection and promotion of the new orthodoxy’s view of the 
good society and the good life of the individual. 
It is within this larger context that the migration of the 
“weaponization” accusation from religious freedom to free 
speech over only a short span of years is best understood. Far 
from indicating that the several rights of the First Amendment 
will apply with differential force in future cases, or that dissi-
dents might strategically deploy arguments from speech free-
dom more effectively than religious freedom, it suggests that 
the fates of the rights of religious freedom and free speech to-
day, as in past eras, are likely to be conjoined. Where “liberal 
anxieties about speech traditionally arose in response to anxie-
ties about theologically orthodox or illiberal opinion, they 
nowadays also arise in response to fears about socially or polit-
ically illiberal opinion.”261 The conceptual unity of speech and 
religious freedom throughout the several periods of their de-
velopment derives from the common theological, political, and 
cultural assumptions prevalent in American society across 
time. 
CONCLUSION 
The freedoms of speech and religion are not ends in them-
selves. They are part of the social superstructure—whether ful-
ly articulated or otherwise—that prevails during any given pe-
riod. In tracing the history of the prevailing conceptual 
justifications for and limits on the freedoms of the First 
Amendment through three such American periods, this Article 
has argued that these freedoms are always connected to, and 
delimited by, larger frameworks and assumptions about the 
good polity and the good society. 
This was understood in the early republican period, where 
the rights of free speech and religious liberty were located 
within, and shaped by, a natural rights worldview that con-
templated considerable discretion in the political community’s 
judgment about the ends and limits of these rights. But over the 
course of the twentieth century, as the First Amendment 
turned inward, the scope of the freedoms grew exponentially. 
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At no time in our history have these rights been more powerful 
and their coverage more vast. 
The wild successes of the First Amendment have brought on 
deep anxieties that the rights of free speech and religious free-
dom have been permanently disconnected from any greater 
common social purposes. This is the First Amendment’s sick-
ness unto death, and it has generated an ever-expanding host 
of arguments for First Amendment constriction, academic as 
well as judicial. Claims for constriction, notwithstanding their 
vague appeal to ideals of “democracy,” “dignity,” the avoid-
ance of “third-party harm,” and others, themselves depend 
upon highly contested notions of the common political and 
moral good. Yet First Amendment constriction in the service of 
these new, putatively common, ends—ends that flourished 
during the years of the First Amendment’s hypertrophy—are 
unlikely to reconstitute a deeply fragmented polity. 
Yet the constrictors’ claims do demonstrate the fundamental 
conceptual unity of the rights of free speech and religious liber-
ty. Both rights have developed in historical tandem against 
prevailing theological, political, and cultural orthodoxies. Both 
provide the dissident from those orthodoxies recourse to dis-
sent or, at least, to stand aside from prevailing opinion. Both 
are in consequence resisted by those who embrace the prevail-
ing orthodoxies and would like to see them entrenched and 
extended. The fate of both rights will be the same. 
 
